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AVOIDING FORCED PARENTHOOD: A
PRACTICAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO RESOLVE
DISPUTES INVOLVING THE DISPOSITION OF
EMBRYOS
Melanie M. Lupsa
I.

INTRODUCTION

Creation of binding law as a means of regulating new technology tends
to follow behind the invention and utilization of such technology.1 Assisted
reproductive technology (ART) is no exception2 given its recent surge in
popularity.3 In fact, the lack of related legislation has had a profound effect.4
This is especially true given that the fertility industry regulates itself with the
help of independent associations.5 The judiciary specifically is having an


J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Muhlenberg College. I
would like to thank Professor Carl Coleman for his guidance and insight in writing this
Comment.
1
See Tom Gjelten, Technology Outpacing Policymakers, Needs of NSA, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO:
PRIVACY
&
SECURITY
(Nov.
19,
2013,
2:54
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/11/19/246049281/technologyoutpacing-policymakers-needs-of-nsa (stating technology is advancing too fast for policy
writing to keep up with it).
2
See Marina Merjan, Rethinking the “Force” Behind “Forced Procreation”: The Case
for Giving Women Exclusive Decisional Authority over Their Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos,
64 DEPAUL L. REV. 737, 738 (2015) (arguing law governing embryo use and disposition
disputes has not kept pace with the increased use of IVF).
3
See Heidi Anne Duerr, Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology Continues to
Increase in the United States, OBGYN.NET (May 23, 2011), https://www.obgyn.net/blog/useassisted-reproductive-technology-continues-increase-united-states
(predicting
IVF
procedures will increase 32.7% from 2010 to 2050).
4
See Michael Ollove, Lightly Regulated In Vitro Fertilization Yields Thousands of
Babies
Annually,
WASH. POST:
HEALTH
&
SCI.
(Apr.
13,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/lightly-regulated-in-vitrofertilization-yields-thousands-of-babies-annually/2015/04/13/f1f3fa36-d8a2-11e4-8103fa84725dbf9d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1e93a87e8899 (highlighting that the
federal government and the separate states have given the fertility industry much freedom
regarding regulatory matters, making the United States unlike the rest of the developed
world).
5
See Alissa Stockage, Regulating Multiple Birth Pregnancies: Comparing the United
Kingdom’s Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme with the United States’ Progressive, Intimate
Decision-Making Approach, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 559, 573 (2010) (explaining fertility
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especially difficult time deciding cases that involve disputes following ART
treatment given the absence of legal precedent that courts rely on for
direction.6
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a type of ART that assists many couples
in making an embryo of their own, that when implanted in a uterus, could
grow into a human being.7 The embryo’s creation takes place in a laboratory
by fertilizing an egg of a female with sperm obtained from a male.8
Normally, a couple creates multiple embryos at one time regardless of
whether the parties intend to use all embryos created.9 Creation of multiple
embryos is attributable to the high cost of the procedure as well as the
possibility that the first embryo transfer may be unsuccessful and never
implant in the woman’s uterus.10 Those who wish to preserve their embryos
have the option to cryopreserve unused embryos for future use.11
IVF reached the public sphere in 1978 when scientists successfully
created an embryo in vitro, and thus, outside the womb.12 Since then, in vitro
technology has successfully assisted millions of couples who otherwise
would not have had the opportunity to reproduce and create families of their
own.13 Couples, however, do not always have a happily ever after and
consequently terminate their relationships. Given that the fertility industry
has failed to institute proper precautions, the fate of preserved embryos has
become complicated, and ultimately courts are called on to resolve
clinics are self-regulated by professional medical associations).
6
See Who’s Your Daddy (or Mommy)?? Maryland & Washington, DC Family Law and
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), BRODSKY RENEHAN PEARLSTEIN & BOUQUET,
CHARTERED: WHITEPAPERS (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.brpfamilylaw.com/art/ (stating that
because medical advances have not been accompanied by legal developments, there is little
precedent on ART issues; so, courts are forced to resolve issues that few have before
considered without precedent).
7
See Steven P. Calandrillo & Chryssa V. Deliganis, In Vitro Fertilization and the Law:
How Legal and Regulatory Neglect Compromised a Medical Breakthrough, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
311, 314–15 (2015); Michelle F. Sublett, Frozen Embryos: What Are They and How Should
the Law Treat Them, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 536, 586–87 (1990).
8
See Peter A. Clark, Embryo Donation/Adoption: Medical, Legal and Ethical
Perspectives, 5 INTERNET J. L. HEALTHCARE & ETHICS 1, 2 (2008).
9
See id. at 3.
10
See id. (noting the advantages of embryos freezing include decreasing the number of
stimulated treatment cycles needed to achieve pregnancy and decreasing the costs of ARTs).
11
See Sublett, supra note 7, at 587; Marisa G. Zizzi, The Preembryo Prenup: A Proposed
Pennsylvania Statute Adopting a Contractual Approach to Resolving Disputes Concerning
the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 21 WIDENER L.J. 391, 392 (2012) (noting a couple may
choose to freeze embryos not immediately implanted for a later date).
12
See Merjan, supra note 2, at 737–38.
13
See Clark, supra note 8, at 1 (“It is estimated that 2.1 million married couples or 5
million people in the United States are affected by infertility. . . . Approximately 10–15% of
infertile couples become candidates for various forms of Assisted Reproductive Technologies
(ARTs) to assist them in having their own biological children.”).
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disputes.14
During the informed consent process before any treatment takes place,
couples have the option to decide what to do with the embryos they preserve
in the event of certain unfortunate circumstances.15 Couples may mutually
agree that, upon divorce, separation, death, or incapacity, they will donate
the embryos, destroy the embryos, or grant one of the two parents, also
known as progenitors, sole control over the embryos.16 Sometimes,
however, before ART treatment, couples do not explicitly agree to a certain
course of action, or the agreement is ambiguous as to a method of disposition
under the circumstances.17 Even more often, a change of circumstances leads
one progenitor to refuse to abide by a prior agreement drafted and signed
before the creation of the embryos.18 Courts have adopted varying
approaches to resolving the issue of which partner has the right to use, donate
or dispose of surplus frozen embryos when the couple disagrees.19
This Comment as a whole will attempt to identify, explain, and resolve
issues related to the resolution of embryo dispute litigation. Part II of this
Comment will discuss in detail the three divergent approaches courts use to
resolve disposition litigation, namely the balancing approach, the
contemporaneous mutual consent approach, and the contractual approach.
This section will define each approach as well as illustrate how courts have
applied them to resolve disagreements. It will then discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of adopting each approach. Part III will suggest a uniform
legal framework that legislatures may adopt and for courts to apply when
resolving disposition cases. This proposed framework will consider the
advantages and disadvantages of each of the three divergent approaches
discussed in Part II in relation to various situations and will be applied to
each approach accordingly. This section will also introduce Szafranski v.
Dunston,20 a recent Illinois Appellate Court case that adopted a similar
14
See Merjan, supra note 2, at 738 (“When the couple that created the pre-embryos no
longer agrees as to their disposition . . . the courts have had to decide the ultimate fate of those
pre-embryos.”); Michael T. Flannery, “Rethinking” Embryo Disposition upon Divorce, 29 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 233 (2013) (explaining courts are often forced to confront
disposition of embryos and construct alternative resolutions when couples fail to expressly
state in a contract the disposition method upon divorce or when public policy renders the
contract unenforceable).
15
William G. Beatty, Szafranski and Beyond: The Continuing Controversy over Custody
Rights to Frozen Embryos in Illinois, 25 ILL. ASS’N DEF. TRIAL COUNS.: IDC Q. 1, 1 (2015).
16
See id.
17
See Flannery, supra note 14, at 233.
18
See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (denying wife’s suit to enforce signed
and valid disposition contract due to significantly changed circumstances despite husband’s
objection).
19
See Beatty, supra note 15, at 2.
20
993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
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method of analysis to that proposed in this Comment.
Part IV will focus largely on Szafranski v. Dunston, highlighting
relevant facts, party testimony, and the analysis of the court. Afterward, this
section will distinguish the Szafranski case from the cases in Part II that
adopted the contractual approach to disposition litigation as a means of
illustrating why the Szafranski court erred in adopting the contractual
approach. Specifically, this section will assert that it is necessary to refine
the definition of contracts used when adopting the contractual approach. Part
V will outline a model code to integrate necessary preventative measures as
a means of avoiding embryo disposition litigation. Such measures, if taken
by fertility clinics, will clearly define the intent of progenitors and avoid the
issues that surfaced in Szafranski. Finally, Part VI of this Comment will
summarize and conclude.
II. THE THREE APPROACHES COURTS USE TO DECIDE EMBRYO
DISPOSITION LITIGATION
A. The Balancing Approach Defined and Applied
Under the balancing approach, the disputing parties relay their distinct
interests to the court and those interests alone govern the resolution of the
dispute.21 The approach puts all discretionary power in a judge since the
court is the sole entity that will balance the interests of the parties.22
Adoption of the balancing approach takes place in both the absence of a prior
agreement between the parties as well as in the presence of such an
agreement.23
Adoption of the balancing approach in the absence of a prior agreement
took place in the Tennessee Supreme Court case Davis v. Davis.24 In Davis,
the court faced a dispute between progenitors as to the disposition of
embryos following the couple’s divorce25 and subsequently evaluated the
couple’s conflicting interests.26 Ultimately, the court held in favor of the
party attempting to avoid procreation because the party wishing to procreate

21

Id. at 512.
Id.
23
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Bailey Henneberg, Maryland
Woman Wins Custody of Frozen Embryos, PATCH: POL. & GOV’T (Jan. 7, 2013),
https://patch.com/maryland/uppermarlboro/judge-awards-maryland-woman-custody-offrozen-embryos (describing Mbah v. Anong, CAD11-11394, CAD10-24995 (Md. Circ. Ct.,
7th Jud. Dist., Dec. 21, 2012), a case of first impression in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County, Maryland).
24
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
25
Id. at 590.
26
Id. at 604.
22
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could still attempt to do so through another cycle of IVF.27 Notably,
however, the Davis court stressed that if a prior agreement existed between
the parties, that agreement would have controlled the dispute’s resolution.28
Because there was no prior agreement, the court suggested that the balancing
approach was only a last resort in which case the party wishing to avoid
procreation would prevail.29
Likewise, a Maryland Circuit Court adopted the balancing approach in
considering the disposition of embryos, but unlike Davis, the court adopted
the approach where a valid contract existed.30 In this case, the parties
originally executed an agreement that granted the wife the embryos in the
event of a separation.31 When that time came, however, the husband wanted
the embryos destroyed.32 Despite the valid contract previously agreed upon
by the parties, the court focused solely on balancing the interests of the
parties to rule, explicitly ignoring the agreed upon contract between the
parties.33 Given that the wife removed her fallopian tubes to help her
conceive, she contended that she could not have children without using the
embryos.34 Considering the wife’s permanent inability to bear biologicallyrelated children and the husband’s voluntary relinquishment of his right to
the embryos, the court held in favor of the wife.35 It was only a coincidence
that the court ruled in such a way that was consistent with the previously
made agreement between the parties.
B. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach Defined and
Applied
Courts that have adopted the contemporaneous consent approach to
disposition disputes held that it is most important to promote the current
intentions of the parties involved regardless of any past agreements.36
Although these courts presume that contracts with terms related to embryo
storage are enforceable, they will not uphold such agreements in disputes
where one of the parties has had a change of heart.37 This means that “[i]f
one of the partners rescinds an advance disposition decision and the other
27

Id.
Id. at 597.
29
Id. at 597.
30
See Henneberg, supra note 23.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 81 (1999).
37
See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782–83 (Iowa 2003).
28
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does not, the mutual consent principle would not be satisfied and the
previously agreed-upon disposition decision could not be carried out.”38
In In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa Supreme Court held that there
was no remedy regarding disposition when parties disagree about the
particular method of disposal.39 There must be contemporaneous mutual
consent of the parties for a disposition method to be lawfully carried out.40
In this case, the parties signed a generic form that required joint consent for
release of the embryos unless a party became deceased.41 The form,
however, did not specify the method of disposition in the event of divorce.42
Upon divorce, the wife opposed donation of the embryos and wanted to use
them to get pregnant.43 The husband did not oppose donation or storage but
did not want to father biologically-related children.44 The court held that the
embryos were to remain in storage, arguably in perpetuity, because there was
no mutual consent between the parties.45
C. The Contractual Approach Defined and Applied
Most courts have adopted the contractual approach to disposition
cases.46 “Under this approach, courts . . . enforce contracts governing the
disposition of pre-embryos which were entered into at the time of [IVF
informed consent] so long as they do not violate public policy.”47
Consider Kass v. Kass where prior to creating the embryos the parties
signed a consent form providing that in the event of divorce a property
settlement would determine the disposition of the embryos.48 In spite of this,
a provision in that same consent form called for donation to research if the
couple could not agree on the method of disposition.49 When the parties

38

Id. at 778.
Id. at 772.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 773.
42
Id.
43
In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 772–73.
44
Id. at 773.
45
Id. at 783.
46
Carinne Jaeger, Yours, Mine, or Ours: Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes Through
Genetics, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1141, 1146 (2017). See Michele M. Jochner, Disposition of
Frozen Embryos is Governed by Contract, SCHILLER DUCANTO & FLECK LLP: FAMILY L.
TOPICS BLOG (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.familylawtopics.com/2013/10/disposition-frozenembryos-governed-contract/ (the contractual approach is used by five states, the
contemporaneous mutual assent approach is used by one state, and the balancing approach is
used by three states).
47
Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (citing In re Witten
672 N.W.2d at 776); see Merjan, supra note 2, at 753.
48
696 N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1998).
49
Id. at 181.
39
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divorced and could not agree on the means of disposition, the New York
Court of Appeals deemed the cryopreservation agreement valid and upheld
the donation provision.50
In In Re Marriage of Dahl, the parties signed an Embryology
Laboratory Specimen Storage Agreement that set forth the terms between
the couple and the clinic before they underwent the IVF procedure.51 The
agreement did not address the disposal of frozen embryos following the
dissolution of the couple’s marriage.52 The agreement did, however, provide
that the wife, who at the time of the case wanted to destroy or donate the
embryos, would have the final say over the embryos if the parties disagreed
as to their fate in the event of divorce.53 At the time of separation, the wife
opposed both the usage of the embryos herself and by another couple.54 The
husband on the other hand strongly opposed the destruction of the embryos
and requested that the court mandate their donation to another couple.55 The
Oregon court upheld the provision in the agreement and ruled in favor of the
wife, despite the husband having denied reading or signing the agreement
stipulating that his ex-wife have ultimate decision-making authority.56
In Roman v. Roman, a Texas court upheld a provision in a clinic consent
form to discard unused embryos in the event of divorce.57 The court
determined that the form was enforceable and thus, controlled the resolution
of the disposition of all embryos.58 As such, the court ruled in favor of the
husband seeking to discard the embryos, although his former wife wanted to
implant them.59 Likewise, in Litowitz v. Litowitz, the Washington Supreme
Court upheld a provision in a cryopreservation contract that provided the
clinic thaw and discard any embryos still in storage five years after the first
day of cryopreservation.60 When the couple divorced, the wife sought to
implant the embryos in a surrogate and the husband sought to put them up
for adoption.61 Irrespective of the progenitors’ desires, the court decided to
uphold the contract’s thawing provision because more than five years had
passed by the time of the court’s decision.62
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 182.
194 P.3d 834, 836 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id. at 837, 841.
193 S.W.3d 40, 54–55 (Tex. App. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 43, 54.
48 P.3d 261, 263–64, 269 (Wash. 2002).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 268–69.
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D. A Discussion of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Each
Approach
Many of the advantages of one approach act as the disadvantages of
another and vice versa. As such, it is important to balance the advantages
and disadvantages of each approach to disposition litigation to determine
which approach best promotes justice in a given scenario.
The major controversial aspect of the balancing approach is that courts
act as “decision makers in [a] highly emotional and personal area.”63
Normally, the justice system avoids involving itself in such personal
situations, especially when parties have contracted privately as to the issues
in question.64 In cryopreservation disputes, however, courts have sometimes
found it appropriate to intervene.65 As the court in Davis mentioned, when
there is no contract to refer to, the balancing approach is the best hope in
bringing justice to the situation.66 Even in cases where there is a contract,
more careful consideration of the situation may be necessary if a certain
outcome severely burdens one of the parties. This was evident in the
Maryland Circuit Court decision where the court felt the need to balance the
desire to avoid parenthood against the desire to be a mother.67 The balancing
approach evaluates all relevant evidence including testimony from the
parties involved as well as the significance of related public policy
concerns.68
Unlike the balancing approach, the contemporaneous mutual consent
approach acknowledges that “decisions about the disposition of frozen
embryos belong to the couple that created the embryo, with each partner
entitled to an equal say in how the embryos should be disposed
[of].”69 Moreover, the contemporaneous mutual consent approach addresses
the biggest concern of the contractual approach by allowing a party to change
his or her mind.70 In adopting this approach, Courts express the belief that
63

In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003).
See id. at 781; Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[T]he
right of private contract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and . . . the usual and
most important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and enforce contracts, than
to enable parties . . . to escape from their obligation on the pretext of public policy. . .”);
Sublett, supra note 7, at 605 (“The right of privacy in the United States . . . has developed
through case law applying various principles of the Constitution. The right of privacy has
come to encompass basic decisions concerning the family unit such as procreation and . . . the
right not to create life.”).
65
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992).
66
Id. at 604.
67
Henneberg, supra note 23.
68
Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
69
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Coleman, supra
note 36, at 81).
70
Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 511; see In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777–78.
64
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when a couple is unable to agree to the method of disposition, the most
rational solution is to keep embryos as they are, which generally means
frozen in storage.71 According to proponents of the contemporaneous mutual
consent approach, other possible disposition decisions apart from continued
preservation are final and irrevocable, and so delaying a hastened decision
“makes it possible for the partners to reach an agreement at a later time.”72
This notion, however, rests on the assumption that keeping embryos frozen
when couples cannot agree does, in fact, promote the possibility that the
individuals will eventually reach a more favorable agreement.73 On the other
hand, critics argue that “[i]f the parties could reach an agreement, they would
not be in court.”74 The main rationale for adopting the contemporaneous
mutual consent approach is that agreements that in practice eliminate one’s
right to decide whether or not to become a biological parent violate public
policy.75
Unlike the balancing and contemporaneous mutual consent approaches,
the advance agreements of the contractual approach, if drafted correctly with
the proper guidance, can help ensure that individuals who decide to undergo
IVF treatment do so only after full contemplation of all repercussions and
the making of a reasoned decision.76 If agreed to beforehand, couples can
“determine the fate of their frozen embryos in a manner that coincides with
their beliefs, morals, and feelings.”77 Prior agreements “leave a clear record
memorializing [the] parties’ intent, which . . . allow[s] the parties to rely on
them; [thus promoting fairness].”78 This is especially true when the contract
concerns family planning.79 Lastly, previously thought out and agreed upon
contracts ensure that no party must unwilling embark on parenthood. If a
party knows he or she would not like to be a biological parent in the event of
separation, that party can proactively choose not to sign away his or her right
to avoid parenthood.
Naturally, there are several arguments against using the contractual
approach to resolve disposition litigation. A large concern in promoting the
71

In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 778 (quoting Coleman, supra note 36, at 110–12).
Id. (quoting Coleman, supra note 36, at 110–12).
73
Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1135 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
74
Id. at 1135 n.5.
75
See In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d. at 777.
76
See American Medical Association, AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 4.2.5 –
Storage & Use of Human Embryos (adopted June 2016) [hereinafter AMA].
77
Zizzi, supra note 11, at 413.
78
Amanda West, Note, Reproductive Freedom or Forced Reproduction: An Analysis of
Minnesota Statutory Law Dealing with Parentage of Frozen Embryos After Divorce, 34
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 259, 263 (2012).
79
See Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (where the wife
sought treatment to make sure she could have biologically related children given that the
chemotherapy would likely render her infertile).
72
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contractual approach is the length, content, and number of informed consent
documents that patients must sign.80 Embryo disposition terms are
sometimes in various documents81 and “present . . . information using highly
technical language in densely packed, single-spaced documents, that may not
even clearly delineate the different topics.”82 The nature of such informed
consent forms can impede an individual’s ability to make a thought-out and
informed decision,83 especially when couples are emotional.84 Moreover,
disposition forms demand that couples imagine worst-case scenarios.85
These scenarios focus on future mortality and divorce.86 As a result,
accomplishing serious and careful drafting becomes difficult given that “[i]t
puts people . . . in a really awkward position.”87 Though this should not
matter, it is a factor that many critics believe ultimately prevents parties from
contracting in a way that would justify adopting the contractual approach in
all disputes.88
Lastly, a major disadvantage of the contractual approach is that even if
couples can fully contemplate every possible future scenario far in advance,
their current views of those scenarios should not automatically take
precedence over future views of those same scenarios. Critics assert that
“individuals are entitled to make decisions consistent with their
contemporaneous wishes, values, and beliefs.”89 As such, “‘treating
couples’ decisions about the future use of their frozen embryos as binding
80
See generally Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic
Consent Forms Are Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57 (2011).
81
Id. at 67 (mentioning documents include those that cover risks and benefits, egg
retrieval, etc.).
82
Id. (citing Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents,
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 931 (2000) (discusses problems of consent forms and argues for a
change in the way consent forms are presented)).
83
See S. Michael Sharp, Common Problems with Informed Consent in Clinical Trials, 5
RES. PRAC. 133, 135 (2004) (identifying poor readability and excessive length as barriers to
obtaining informed consent).
84
See Beatty, supra note 15, at 11 (“Despite the existence of a presumptively valid and
enforceable agreement as to the custodial and dispositional rights regarding frozen embryos,
it may be argued by one of the parties to the agreement that the emotional pressure that the
party was under at the time of signing vitiated genuine informed consent.”); Roman v. Roman,
193 S.W.3d 40, 52–53 (Tex. App. 2006) (considering whether the wife was “too emotionally
upset to give consent”).
85
See Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Factors That Affect Infertility Patients’ Decisions
About Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1623, 1628 (2006).
86
Id.
87
Roy Strom, SCOTUS Ends Long Illinois Embryo Battle, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Mar. 2,
2016, 2:25 PM), https://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/archives/2016/03/02/embryo-03-0216.
88
See Sharp, supra note 83, at 135.
89
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Coleman, supra
note 36, at 88–89).
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contracts undermines important values about families, reproduction, and the
strength of genetic ties.”90 The “possible lack of true informed consent to
support the contract” is also an issue when parties do not contemplate the
possibility of certain circumstances but those circumstances come to fruition
and the prior agreement still governs. 91
Irrespective of the above criticisms, on balance, the contractual
approach is the soundest means of resolving embryo disposition disputes.
Unlike the balancing and contemporaneous mutual consent approaches, the
contractual approach attempts to help parties resolve the disposition issue
both efficiently and effectively. It not only avoids costly and timely
litigation but also preserves resources used to freeze embryos for the right
reasons only, not simply because a couple cannot agree.92 Furthermore,
courts have continuously promoted the freedom to privately contract unless
the matter is against public policy.93 The contractual approach is in line with
this principle given that it precludes judicial involvement in private family
decisions.94 “[B]y honoring the contract that the parties entered into, the
parties are given the power in making these personal decisions while keeping
the state from interfering in the matter.”95
III. A PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK
To reiterate, this Comment will propose model legislation that all courts
should adopt in embryos disposition cases. As such, the following
discussion articulates a uniform legal framework by considering the
advantages and disadvantages of each disposition method in relation to
various situations.
A. Situations in Which Adoption of Each Approach is Appropriate
When parties disagree as to disposition and there is no contract in
existence to apply the contractual approach, the balancing of interests
approach is the best hope for an appropriate resolution.96 As such, the
90

Id.
Beatty, supra note 15, at 8.
92
See Zizzi, supra note 11, at 400 (“The contractual approach is appealing due to its
simplicity . . . .”).
93
See Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[T]he . . . most
important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and enforce contracts, than to
enable parties . . . to escape from their obligation on the pretext of public policy, unless it
clearly appear[s] that they contravene public right or the public welfare.”).
94
Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Kass v. Kass, 696
N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1998).
95
Zizzi, supra note 11, at 400.
96
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); see also infra Part IV
discussing the Szafranski holding.
91
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balancing approach should act only as a supplement to the contractual
approach, not an approach used on its own. For instance, it should not be
the sole approach used by the court in making a judgment, as it was in the
Maryland Circuit Court case when a valid contract clearly stated what the
parties willingly agreed to previously.97
The contractual approach is the only approach appropriately adopted
when a contract is in existence and the parties disagree.98 Though it requires
courts to adhere to and strictly uphold an agreed upon contract despite
extenuating circumstances, courts should not shy away from applying the
contractual approach. It is the only approach that promotes both efficient
resolutions of disputes and effective use of embryo preservation resources.
In practice, the adoption of the contemporaneous mutual assent
approach should never occur. If a contract between the parties exists and the
parties disagree, the contract should govern the dispute and adoption of the
contractual approach should take place. On the other hand, if a contract does
not exist and the parties disagree, the balancing approach should govern the
dispute and a court should weight the compelling interests of both parties.
Realistically, if both parties are going to be able to contemporaneously assent
in court before a judge, they should be able to do so outside the court.
Therefore, adopting the contemporaneous mutual assent approach is neither
effective nor efficient. It not only results in costly and timely litigation but
also depletes resources used to freeze embryos.99
B. Szafranski Resolved Using the Proposed Legal Framework
The Illinois Appellate Court’s basic approach used to resolve
Szafranski v. Dunston100 is consistent with the proposed framework, and,
therefore, serves as an example of the efficient and effective nature of the
proposed legal framework above. The Szafranski court held that when
parties disagree in the presence of a contract, the contractual approach
governs.101 As such the court found that the oral agreement between the
parties—providing that the plaintiff, Szafranski, would unconditionally
donate his sperm for the defendant’s unconditional use of the resulting
embryos—was valid and completely binding.102 This resulted in the
defendant, Dunston, entitled to sole custody.103
97

See generally Sublett, supra note 7.
See Zizzi, supra note 11, at 400 (“The contractual approach is appealing due to its
simplicity . . . .”).
99
See id.
100
34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
101
Id. at 1162.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 1161.
98
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Anticipating an appeal of the decision, the court added that when parties
disagree in the absence of a contract, the balancing approach governs.104 In
this case, the court believed that Dunston’s desire to have a biological child
and the fact she could not without using the embryos (due to infertility),
outweighed Szafranski’s desire to avoid parenthood.105 Note, given the
above, the court implicitly suggested that the contemporaneous mutual
consent approach has no place in the debate when parties disagree and want
a final resolution to their dispute.
IV. SZAFRANSKI GOT IT WRONG: DEFINING CONTRACTS USED IN THE
CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
Dependence on an appropriate contract is vital to the justified use of the
contractual approach. As such, refining of what constitutes an appropriate
contract in embryo disposition litigation must take place.
A. Relevant Case Facts that Illustrate the Court’s Error
In 2009, Szafranski and Dunston began dating and shortly thereafter in
2010, the doctor diagnosed Dunston with lymphoma.106 The doctor
informed Dunston that her course of treatment could result in infertility.107
Given her desire to have biological children, she met with a fertility specialist
at the Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation (“Northwestern”), who
informed her of the option to create and freeze embryos.108 After her meeting
with the Northwestern specialist, Dunston called Szafranski and told him her
options.109 She was nervous about using an anonymous sperm donor and so
asked Szafranski if he would “be willing to provide sperm to make preembryos with her.”110 Szafranski agreed to Dunston’s request over the
phone.111
The next day, Szafranski and Dunston met with Northwestern staff.112
Both parties signed and dated the “Informed Consent for Assisted
Reproduction” (“Informed Consent”) that explained Northwestern’s legal
rights and obligations.113 Along with providing the clinic’s legal rights and
obligations, it contained a provision applicable to the disposing of preserved

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1137.
Id.
Id. at 1137–38.
Id. at 1138.
Id.
Id.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1138.
Id.
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embryos:
Because of the possibility of you and/or your partner’s separation,
divorce, death, or mental incapacitation, it is important, if you
choose to cryopreserve your embryos, for you to decide what
should be done with any of your cryopreserved embryos that
remain in the laboratory in such an eventuality. Since this is a
rapidly evolving field, both medically and legally, the clinic
cannot guarantee what the available or acceptable avenues for
disposition will be at any future date. At the present time, the
options are: (1) discarding the cryopreserved embryos, (2)
donating the cryopreserved embryos for approved research
studies, [or] (3) donating the cryopreserved embryos to another
couple in order to attempt pregnancy . . . . No use can be made of
these embryos without the consent of both partners (if
applicable).114
Dunston and Szafranski initialed next to the option to donate the
embryos to another couple.115 After their appointment at Northwestern,
Szafranski and Dunston met with an attorney at the recommendation of the
clinic.116 With the attorney, they discussed two possible arrangements: a coparenting agreement where Szafranski would be, in the very least, financially
involved in the child’s life, and a sperm donor agreement, where Szafranski
would have no obligations and waive his parental rights.117 Following the
meeting, Dunston sent an email to the attorney stating that the couple had
decided to go forward with the co-parenting agreement.118 The attorney
prepared this agreement and emailed it to Dunston. Neither party ever signed
the emailed agreement.119
Shortly after Dunston began chemotherapy, Szafranski ended their
relationship.120 They did not speak in the interim.121 A couple months later,
Szafranski sent Dunston an email expressing his concern in having created
the embryos with Dunston and in a second email announced, “that he could
not let her use the pre-embryos and that he wanted them to be donated to
science or research.”122 At first, Szafranski agreed to sign over the embryos
to Dunston but then changed his mind and filed a lawsuit against Dunston to
enjoin her from using the embryos.123 Dunston filed a counterclaim seeking
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id. at 1139.
Id.
Id.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1139.
Id.
Id. at 1140.
Id.
Id. at 1141.
Id.
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sole custody and control over the pre-embryos.124
B. Relevant Testimony by the Parties Involved
Szafranski testified that he “understood the Informed Consent as
requiring both his and [Dunston]’s approval prior to any use of the preembryos.”125 He also testified that during their meeting with Northwestern,
the clinic told him that any use of the pre-embryos would require the consent
of both individuals because no marriage bound the parties.126 He
acknowledged that the clinic encouraged he seek an attorney to determine
the fate of the embryos in the event of a separation.127 In spite of the above,
he relentlessly asserted that he never agreed to any term that would give
Dunston sole control over the disposition of the pre-embryos in the event of
their separation.128 As a matter of fact, he believed that any such term
contradicted what the attorney told him his rights would be as a co-parent
and what he and Dunston both agreed to in the clinic’s Informed Consent
document.129
By contrast, Dunston testified that it was her understanding that she and
Szafranski “always agreed that he was doing this to help [her] create embryos
to have a biological child with no other attachment.” 130 Moreover, “it was
her understanding that she and Szafranski would be documenting their
wishes through an attorney as opposed to in the Informed Consent.”131
Furthermore, she asserted that she and Szafranski “agreed that he was
donating the sperm for one reason and one reason only, for [her] to have
biological children after [her] cancer treatment.”132 She claimed that “there
was really no need to ask for that term to be put into a form” given the nature
of their oral agreement and mutual understanding of why she was undergoing
IVF.133 Regarding the email she sent the attorney requesting the co-parenting
agreement as opposed to the sperm donation agreement, Dunston testified
that she was going through a very stressful time and did not thoroughly
review the draft.134

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1136.
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1142–43.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1143.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Appellate Court’s Ruling
Szafranski conceded that he formed an oral contract with Dunston to
create embryos.135 Thus, the court only needed to determine the scope of the
agreement between the parties— whether the oral contract was to create
embryos or to create babies.136 “At trial, both [Szafranski] and [Dunston]
testified that they never discussed whether [Szafranski’s] consent would be
needed to use the pre-embryos” to create offspring.137 Nonetheless, because
Szafranski admitted that it ‘“never crossed [his] mind’” to place limitations
on Dunston’s use of the pre-embryos,138 the court determined it was
reasonable to infer that he never desired to limit Dunston’s use of the preembryos in any way.139
Szafranski argued that because the oral agreement was ambiguous and
“silent on the issue of whether [Dunston] has an unlimited and unqualified
right to use the pre-embryos,” it could not “reflect the parties’ mutual assent
or intent to grant [Dunston] such a right.”140 He argued that “the court should
honor the parties’ silence” with respect to creating limitations.141 The court
addressed Szafranski’s arguments by reiterating that the consent form
contemplated ‘“another agreement between the parties may govern the future
disposition of the embryos”‘ and that ‘“Northwestern will abide by any
agreement reached between the parties.”‘142 To that end, the court held that
“[Dunston and Szafranski’s] previous oral agreement [which took place over
the phone,] [was] not contradicted or modified by any language in the
Informed Consent” and so was valid and binding.143
According to the court, “[t]he Informed Consent merely advised the
parties that Northwestern had no legal right to use or dispose of the preembryos in any manner that either [Szafranski] or [Dunston] would find
objectionable.”144 Furthermore, “the informed consent agreement was
primarily a contract between the couple and the clinic, rather than between
the donors themselves.”145 Since there was no subsequent signed contract
following the couple’s execution of the Informed Consent, the oral
agreement unconditionally bound Szafranski in the absolute, and so Dunston

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 1148.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1148.
Id. at 1152.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1153.
Id.
Id. at 1155.
Beatty, supra note 15, at 5.
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had sole custody.146
D. Criticism of the Court’s Analysis in Szafranski
1. The Danger in Inferring a Contract Existed
A court must not infer the existence of an agreement without sufficient
evidence. By remaining silent on the issue of the embryos’ use, Szafranski
did not negotiate a contract that gave him the right to later object to their
use.”147 In other words, under the facts of the case, which involved a man
who provided sperm outside a committed relationship, expressly to help a
woman preserve her ability to have children in the future, it was reasonable
to assume the man consented to the embryos’ future use by that woman.148
One critic, however, has gone so far as to say “[i]t appears that in the absence
of a written contract between the couple, Illinois courts will assume that
creating an embryo is the same as agreeing to the birth of a child.”149 Despite
the actual extent to which the court’s inference applies, such assumptions in
this context are exceedingly dangerous because parenthood is at stake.150
At the heart of this discussion is the idea of an oral agreement. “An
oral agreement is binding where there is an offer, an acceptance, and a
meeting of the minds as to the terms of the agreement.”151 While there was
an oral contract between the Szafranski parties in regard to creating the
embryos for preservation,152 there was no concrete evidence that suggested
Szafranski gave up his right to consent to implantation of the embryos.153
Szafranski explicitly stated that he would provide Dunston with his sperm so
that she could create the embryos and have the option, not the right, to use
the embryos to have biological children.154 It was unclear, at the time that
he agreed to the oral contract whether Dunston would, in fact, be infertile
after chemotherapy treatment.155 Creating the embryos was merely a
precaution in case the chemotherapy treatment had, in fact, rendered Dunston
infertile.156 For that reason, while it is true that Szafranski and Dunston had

146

Id.
Strom, supra note 87.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1147 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (citing Bruzas v.
Richardson, 945 N.E.2d 1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)).
152
Id. at 1148.
153
See id. at 1138, 1150.
154
Id. at 1138 (stating he would be willing to make pre-embryos with her); see also id. at
1142.
155
Id. at 1137–38.
156
Id.
147
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a meeting of the minds as to the creation of embryos, there was no meeting
of the minds over the eventual implantation of embryos.157 Though
Szafranski himself admitted that placing limitations on Dunston’s “use of the
pre-embryos ‘never crossed [his] mind,’” that does not mean there was a
meeting of the minds as to that issue.158 The silence and ambiguity
surrounding any limitations should have encouraged the court, like others
before it, to lean in favor of the individual attempting to avoid parenthood.159
2. The Danger in Relying on an Oral Agreement as a Contract
An additional criticism of Szafranski involves the court’s reliance on
an oral agreement.160 The contract the court relied upon was the oral
agreement made between the parties over the phone, not the contract made
via the Informed Consent.161 In fact, the Szafranski court was the first to use
an oral contract as a means of adopting the contractual approach in a
disposition suit.162 The majority of cases that adopted the contractual
approach upheld written contracts—specifically informed consent
documents—and considered those to be the disposition agreements that
bound the parties in dispute.163 By contrast, the Szafranski court stated that
the Informed Consent was “a contract between the couple and the clinic,
rather than between the donors themselves.”164 There was no rational reason
for the Szafranski court to rely on the ambiguous oral contract between the
parties when no other court had done so in the presence of an informed
consent document.165
Moreover, it appears that what the court believed were the terms of the
oral contract directly contradicted not only the signed Informed Consent that
required both parties to consent to usage of the embryos but also the later
actions of both parties.166 For instance, if “Northwestern had no legal right
157

See Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1138, 1150.
Id. at 1152.
159
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
160
Beatty, supra note 15, at 5
161
Id.; Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1153.
162
See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 182 (N.Y. 1998); Dahl v. Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 836
(Or. Ct. App. 2008); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54 (Tex. App. 2006); Litowitz v.
Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 268 (Wash. 2002).
163
See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182 (upholding a provision in a cryopreservation agreement
within the informed consent documents); Dahl, 194 P.3d at 836 (upholding a provision in an
Embryology Laboratory Specimen Storage Agreement which the parties signed); Roman, 193
S.W.3d at 54 (upholding a provision in a clinic consent form); Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 268
(upholding a provision in a cryopreservation contract).
164
Beatty, supra note 15, at 5; Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1153.
165
See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182; Dahl, 194 P.3d at 836; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 54;
Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 268.
166
See Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1139, 1142 (Dunston sent an email to the attorney stating
the couple decided to proceed with the co-parenting agreement. Szafranski testified, to which
158

LUPSA (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

5/20/2019 12:14 PM

COMMENT

969

to use or dispose of the pre-embryos in any manner that either [Szafranski]
or [Dunston] would find objectionable,”167 one party cannot decide to use
the embryos without the other’s consent. Northwestern is the entity that
would have to implant the embryos, and the above suggests the clinic cannot
legally do so without the consent of both parties. As such, the court erred in
not considering the consent form as part of the contract between Dunston
and Szafranski. Moreover, the drafting of the co-parenting agreement by an
attorney also sheds light on the fact that Szafranski intended to retain the
opportunity to have input in the embryo’s possible fruition.168 Though
neither party signed the contract, it is of the utmost importance that Dunston,
who knew it would give Szafranski authority over the disposition of the
embryos, requested it.169
3. The Danger in Uncertainty as to Binding Agreements
Szafranski single-handedly “creat[ed] uncertainty about what types of
agreements between couples themselves and between couples and their
fertility providers will be recognized as binding.”170 Dunston and Szafranski
signed a medical consent form provided by the fertility clinic which stated,
“No use can be made of these embryos without the consent of both partners
(if applicable).”171 The court ruled that the consent form did not modify the
oral contract, which explicitly included a provision requiring both parties’
consent.172 This is “‘very dangerous for fertility clinics because it’s no
longer clear that the contracts [the clinic requires] people [to] sign are
meaningful at all.’”173 It was not appropriate for the Szafranski court to use
the oral contract as its basis for adopting the contractual approach. The court
should holistically consider any agreement between the parties considering
all the evidence available and not simply based on a single oral contract made
over the phone. Doing so would have made it clear that Szafranski did, in
fact, preserve his right to consent to the fate of the embryos in the Informed
Consent.

the clinic confirmed, that the Informed Consent required both his and Dunston’s approval
before use of the pre-embryos.).
167
Id. at 1155.
168
Id. at 1139.
169
Id.
170
Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Illinois Disputed Embryos Case, ALLIANCE FOR
FERTILITY
PRESERVATION:
ALLIANCE
BLOG
(Mar.
8,
2016),
http://www.allianceforfertilitypreservation.org/blog/supreme-court-refuses-to-hear-illinoisdisputed-embryos-case.
171
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1135.
172
See id. at 1142, 1154, 1156.
173
Strom, supra note 87.
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V. PROACTIVE MEASURES ARE KEY AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING
OUTCOMES LIKE SZAFRANSKI
Avoiding cases like Szafranski is easy, but it is the fertility clinic’s
responsibility to better prepare patients for the potential consequences of its
services. The best way to approach this issue is to take the problem out of
the court’s hands. This involves being “proactive and resolv[ing] this issue
by enacting legislation.”174 Advance directives via written agreements that
anticipate “possible contingencies and . . . specify [patient] wishes in
writing”175 not only “minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative
liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the
first instance a quintessentially personal, private decision [but] also provide
the certainty needed for effective operation of [IVF] programs.”176 As a
matter of public policy, states should enact legislation that requires fertility
clinics to be proactive. Some states have already taken it upon themselves to
do just that.
A. Examples of Enacted Legislative Approaches to Disposition
Agreements
In Florida, IVF legislation states that:
all of the decision-making authority concerning the disposition of
the frozen embryos in the hands of the couple donating the sperm
and eggs by stating that a “commissioning couple and the treating
physician shall enter into a written agreement that provides for the
disposition of the commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm, and
preembryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any
other unforeseen circumstance.”177
The Florida statute also notes that “[a]bsent a written agreement,
decision-making authority regarding the disposition of the preembryos
reside jointly with the commissioning couple.”178 As such, when there is a
contract present and the parties disagree, Florida requires courts to abide by
the terms of the contract.179 On the other hand, when there is no contract to
depend on, Florida adopts the contemporaneous mutual assent approach.180
The statute, however, stops there.
California law requires that the “health care provider delivering fertility
treatment . . . provide his or her patient with timely, relevant, and appropriate
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

See Zizzi, supra note 11, at 412.
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted).
Id.
See Zizzi, supra note 11, at 410 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2005)).
FLA. STAT. § 742.17(2).
See generally id.
See id.
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information to allow the individual to make an informed and voluntary
choice regarding the disposition of any human embryos remaining following
the fertility treatment.”181 Moreover, the statute mandates that the “health
care provider . . . provide a form to . . . [the party or parties involved] that
sets forth advanced written directives regarding the disposition of
embryos.’”182 Finally, California law provides that all involved parties in
disposition decisions must agree upon one of the directives for the
disposition.183 If the party or parties involved would like to choose another
option for disposition that is not on the enumerated list, the couple or patient
must “clearly state” the alternative option for disposition.184
While Florida’s statute is effective in implementing a uniform legal
framework for courts to follow, any legislation, if it is to in fact make a
difference, should be more similar to California’s statute.
B. Proposed Model Code: Elements Defined and Implications
Considered
The purpose of this model code is to ensure that patients of IVF go into
treatment with properly drafted contracts to effectively keep disposition
litigation out of the courts. As a preliminary matter, the contract should
include a signature, date, and plain language.185
1. Thorough Review of Agreement Terms and Stressing Their
Binding Nature
To begin, fertility clinics must go over each and every element of the
agreement with the couple seeking in vitro fertilization. The length and
number of consent forms completed before IVF treatment, as well as the
substance and technicality of the language in those forms, should not be a
reason to dismiss terms in a contract. “Patients may regard these forms as
little more than a ritual to access treatment . . . [or] perceive that these forms
exist to protect doctors rather than to contribute to a meaningful, patientprotective educational interaction.”186 To counter this, clinical personnel
must ensure parties thoroughly read all documents presented and ask
questions if they do not understand the technical language read.187 Clinical
181

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(a) (2003).
Id. § 125315(b).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
See id.
186
Jody L. Madeira & Barbara Andraka-Christou, Paper Trails, Trailing Behind:
Improving Informed Consent to IVF Through Multimedia Applications, 3 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES
2, 3 (2016).
187
Id. at 22–24 (discussing informed consent interaction and finding personal
conversations are more helpful to patients in understanding and clarifying the terms of the
182
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personnel must sign off on thoroughly reviewing the terms with the patients.
This will also make clinical personnel liable when essential terms of an
embryo disposition contract are missing or patients claim they did not know
of or did not understand a term they agreed to according to the contract.
Requiring such a signature will make the thorough review of the contract a
fundamental requirement taken seriously rather than it being considered a
trivial formality.
If patients intentionally choose to leave a document unexamined, it
should not be up to the court to remedy the situation and determine
ambiguous or absent terms.188 Though informed consent documents provide
fertility clinics with legal protection,189 such consent forms are also for the
benefit of the patients themselves.190 In sum, these forms act as a
precautionary and preventative tool so courts do not have to involve
themselves in every and all IVF disputes.
2. Agreeing to Disposition Terms Prior to IVF Procedure
Participants in IVF treatment must execute a binding agreement prior
to embryo creation that covers the use and disposition of the embryos in case
of divorce, illness, incapacity or death of one or both parents, or other change
of circumstances including but not limited to separation or estrangement.191
The agreement ought to state explicitly whether an intended parent may use
the embryos in the event of divorce or other circumstances.192 Also, the
agreement ought to contain a statement identifying which of the disposition
methods are impermissible under applicable law.193 For example, some laws
prohibit embryo donation for certain types of research, and progenitors must
know this.194 If all parties correctly execute these precautionary steps, a party
to an embryo disposition agreement cannot be permitted to later withdraw
consent to the terms and prohibit the use of the embryos to initiate a
pregnancy. Allowing revocation by either party down the line would render
consent than simply providing patients with written documents).
188
See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory
of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1267 (1993) (citations omitted)
(“[T]raditionally, there has been a so-called duty to read, which binds those who sign or accept
a contract to the written terms even if they did not read or understand its content.”).
189
See Steven B. Dowd, The Legal, Ethical and Therapeutic Advantage of Informed
Consent, 24 J. NUCLEAR MED. TECH. 129, 129 (1996) (“Obtaining consent from patients . . .
provide[s] legal protection in . . . malpractice cases.”).
190
See id. (discussing that in consent forms patients are educated about risks, benefits,
and treatment alternatives).
191
See, e.g., AMA, supra note 76.
192
See, e.g., id.
193
See, e.g., id.
194
Anne Drapkin Lyerly & Ruth R. Faden, Willingness to Donate Frozen Embryos for
Stem Cell Research, 317 SCI. 46–47 (2007).
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any signed agreement meaningless.
In fact, requiring detailed and complete agreements made prior to IVF
treatment would work a benefit to society. Taking the production of embryos
more seriously may indirectly limit the rapidly increasing number of
embryos created and frozen.195 “It has been estimated that there are 500,000
spare embryos frozen with an additional 20,000 embryos added yearly.”196
Some remain frozen indefinitely.197 Agreements specifically delineating
methods of disposition will ensure embryos kept in cryopreservation are not
there for eternity.
3. Imagining Worst-Case Scenarios and an Effective Way of
Doing So
Participants are more likely to take the production of embryos more
seriously once they know the contracts they are signing are complete and
binding. For example, imagining worst-case scenarios together and making
decisions as to proper disposition if they occur fosters mutual and peaceful
agreement. An agreement as to disposition should not be an issue for
individuals prepared to bring life into the world. If individuals believe that
imagining worst-case scenarios puts them in an awkward position,198 courts
should not remedy the situation and parties should deal with the
consequences themselves.
Correctly drafting advance agreements is only possible through
assistance by attorneys who have dealt with couples in similar situations and
have experience managing the concerns and desires of couples engaged in
IVF. Though it may be a radical requisite, fertility clinics should require
couples to consult with an experienced reproduction law attorney before the
clinics can sign off on informed consent documents. The attorney can be
one of the participants’ choosing or one on staff at the clinic. Either way,
before a clinic can go forward with treatment, the attorney must make sure
all contracts are as encompassing as they can be in the situation. Patients
must fully contemplate all possible scenarios that may arise after treatment.
An attorney can assist the couple in considering potential scenarios and how
to contract for the mutual benefit of the parties. More likely than not, this
will result in the contractual realization of the couple’s present and future
desires, wishes, values, and beliefs. If fertility clinics simply advise patients
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of 1987, there were roughly 4,000 frozen human embryos in existence as compared to only
300 in 1985.”).
196
Clark, supra note 8, at 1.
197
Beatty, supra note 15, at 1.
198
Strom, supra note 87.

LUPSA (DO NOT DELETE)

974

5/20/2019 12:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:951

to consult with an attorney, many will not and, therefore, they will not obtain
the expert analysis that would allow them to truly consider all possible
scenarios and create a properly drafted contract.
Critics may find it inappropriate to require attorneys to advise patients,
specifically because the clinic or the patient would bear the cost of doing so.
These critics, however, must understand that this requirement is a necessary
means to an end. IVF procedure is a privilege with heightened responsibility.
Moreover, some may find it inefficient to require an attorney because of the
potential for conflicting interests between the parties. In those cases, the
parties must use separate attorneys to represent their interests in the final
contract. As such, fertility clinics should have multiple experienced
reproductive attorneys on site or at their disposal.
4. Using Standardized Forms Correctly and Restricting
Supplemental Contracts
Another important practice in IVF clinics is the modification of
standardized informed consent forms. Though standardized forms are the
best way to ensure the inclusion and clear explanation of all the major
options, parties should be free to modify the standardized form. Doing so
largely eliminates the possibility of clinics not properly communicating the
parties’ intentions with respect to disposition decision. There are many other
possibilities couples can consider not typically mentioned in standardized
forms.199 Such possibilities include “dividing the remaining embryos
between the parties; allowing for one party to use the embryos, but
specifying that the ex-spouse not be considered a legal parent under that
situation, or specifying that parental rights would flow from post-dissolution
use of any embryos.”200 Many couples would be unaware of their possible
options if not properly advised. Thus, the entire contract presented to the
couple by the clinic should be largely individualized even if it initially begins
as a standardized contract. Its creation should imitate the creation of a
deposition or affidavit as opposed to how an employee fills out a job
application or a patient fills out a medical form.
Additionally, any other contracts, regardless of nature, should not be
able to supplement informed consent forms as in Szafranski. Supplemental
contracts, even if drafted by attorneys, only complicate the fertility clinic’s
ability to properly set forth the agreed upon terms of the contract. Further,
if the proper drafting of the original agreement between the parties takes
place, there should be no need for supplemental agreements. As such,
embedding all disposition agreements in the clinic’s informed consent form
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both increases efficiency and eliminates questions regarding the types of
agreements recognized as binding. It seems most practical to give the clinic
the sole responsibility of finalizing a valid and binding disposition contract.
After all, the clinic is the first to sit with the patients, conducts the IVF
procedure, and later stores the embryos. Having a single source of concrete
guidance as to the disposal of the embryos will also save the clinics, as well
as patients, time and money when it comes to disputes.
5. The Overall Benefit
A model code will not always create a perfect contract; however,
mandating the creation of complete and integrated binding agreements
before any procedure takes place is a large step in the right direction. In the
end, the goal is to better prepare couples for what may lie ahead if they chose
to undergo IVF treatment. Thus, even if a model code avoids a small amount
of costly litigation for couples, it is a great victory for the regulation of the
IVF industry. There will be no need for a court to decide ambiguities like in
Szafranski.201 The use of seasoned reproductive and family law attorneys
early on will likely guarantee that no couple will ever enter into an agreement
that contains determinative ambiguities detrimental to the parties. For the
most part, this framework will also do away with the need to balance
competing interests. Parties must know from the first instance that their
agreement will govern regardless of changing desires and should add any
provisions they feel necessary to protect themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
Complete contractual agreements made before the commencement of
IVF procedures truly capture the intentions of the parties at the time of
embryo creation. Ultimately, courts should uphold already contemplated
terms, rather than trying to decipher parties’ changed intentions. In
emotional situations, there must be some concrete guidance as to appropriate
action without judicial intervention. Furthermore, if there is no incentive for
patients to truly consider the risks and benefits of undergoing IVF treatment
at the onset or if parties can freely change their mind and file lawsuits to
enforce their new wishes, couples will certainly take less care in making
these important initial decisions. A legal framework is necessary to address
disposition disputes in the fertility industry because it is the only hope in
giving more structure to the disposition of embryos and provide courts with
an ability to approach issues systematically. This, in turn, will benefit all
IVF patients, as it would have in Szafranski, by helping society avoid forced
parenthood and other issues that emerge.
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